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Bullying in Public Schools: The
Intersection Between the Student's
Free Speech Rights and the
School's Duty to Protect
by Elizabeth M. Jaffe'
and Robert J. D'Agostino"
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2009 case of eleven-year-old Jaheem Herrera's suicide in Georgia,
which resulted after alleged repeated verbal bullying by his classmates,'
presents an interesting question regarding whether public schools must
take action to prevent this type of behavior even if it does not disrupt
the classroom. The issue to be addressed is not what speech schools can
censor but whether schools must censor or prevent certain speech that
has a harmful effect on the educational environment for a specific
student or a specifically identifiable group of students.
If a public school student has a civil or liberty right to his education,'
then it may be concluded that there is a duty imposed on the provider
of that education to force students not to interfere with that right.
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1.

Celeste Lawrence, Jaheem Hererra, 11, Laid to Rest, ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 28,

2009, http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/dekalb/stories/2009/04/28/jahem_1aid
rest.html.
2.

See infra note 315.
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Arguably, that duty would require the prevention of certain speech,
regardless of whether the speech is true or otherwise traditionally
protected as part of a "democratic" exchange of ideas if its purpose or
effect is harassment or verbal bullying or if it constitutes an attack on
an individual student's core characteristics.'
Courts often aver in the abstract that student speech cannot be
restrained unless the speech is reasonably likely to "interfere with the
work of the school or impinge on the rights of other[s]." Is there then
a right to be let alone that includes a right to be free from verbal
assaults based upon characteristics such as race, religion, or sexual
orientation? This protection presumably does not or should not include
critiques of behavior, clothing choice, values, and a right not to be
offended unless the purpose of such speech is to inflame, disrupt, or
directly attack a particular student for the purpose of inflicting
psychological harm.' Whether the speech is intended to harm may be
determined by analyzing the language actually used in the context in
which it is used rather than by looking solely at the idea conveyed.
Hence, both content and context are relevant for any speech analysis.
The Supreme Court of the United States classifies school speech as
follows: (1) speech that is to be tolerated; (2) speech that is disruptive of
the educational mission; (3) speech that is vulgar or offensive and hence
inappropriate; or (4) speech that interferes with the rights of another
student or students, such as language that disparages a person on the
basis of core characteristics.6 These classifications come from three now
well-known cases: "(1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech
... is governed by Fraser,(2) school-sponsored speech .. . is governed by
Hazelwood, and (3) all other speech . . . is governed by 7Tnker."' In
recognizing these areas of student speech, courts have attempted to
reach "a balance between the free speech rights of students and the
special need to maintain a safe, secure and effective learning environment."'

3. See infra text accompanying notes 194-202.
4. See, e.g., Gold v. Wilson Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 632 F. Supp. 2d 771, 789 (M.D.
Tenn. 2009).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 189-93.
6. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
7. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2006) (footnotes
omitted), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
8. Id. at 1176.
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Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser

In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,' high school student
Matthew Fraser gave "a speech nominating a fellow student for [a]
student elective office" position at a voluntary school assembly held
during school hours."o Throughout the speech, "Fraser referred to his
[fellow student] in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual
metaphor."" After Fraser delivered the speech, the assistant principal
met with him and notified him that the speech violated the school's
"disruptive-conduct rule," which prohibited conduct that interfered with
the educational process, "including the use of obscene, profane language
or gestures."" Fraser was given a chance to explain his conduct and
admitted using sexual innuendo. Fraser was suspended, and after he
participated in the school's grievance process, Fraser's father filed a suit
as guardian ad litem in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington, alleging a violation of Fraser's right to freedom
of speech."
The district court concluded that the school's sanctions violated the
First Amendment, and the "disruptive-conduct rule [was] unconstitutionally vague and overbroad."" The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Fraser's speech did not have a
disruptive effect on the educational process." The court of appeals
rejected the school's argument that the school needed to protect the
captive audience of students at the assembly from lewd and indecent
Moreover, the court noted that "the School District's
language."
'unbridled discretion' to determine what discourse is 'decent' would
'increase the risk of cementing white, middle-class standards for
determining what is acceptable and proper speech and behavior in our
public schools."'

9. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
10. Id. at 677.
11. Id. at 677-78.
12. Id. at 678-79 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 679.
15. Id. at 679-80. The Supreme Court notably remarked in Fraserthat "It]he marked
distinction between the political 'message' of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual
content of respondent's speech in this case seems to have been given little weight by the
Court of Appeals." Id. at 680.
16. Id. at 680.
17. Id. (quoting Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 755 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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In fact, the district court judge in Frasermay have taken the holding
from Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & EducationalFund, Inc. " a
bit too literally. In Cornelius the Supreme Court recognized that
regulation of a speaker's access to a nonpublic forum can be based on
subject matter "so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light
of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral."" A
distinction is viewpoint-based "when it denies access to a speaker solely
to suppress the point of view he espouses."2 o The district court judge
in Frasermay have concluded that the Bethel School District's suppression of vulgar speech was an attempt to impose a set of values regarding
"decent" speech on students and ignore the purpose served by the high
school assembly forum. Or perhaps the district court judge thought he
should decide the purpose served by the forum.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fraser and reversed the
holding of the court of appeals.2 1 The Court recognized that while the
First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of public
discourse, just because the use of an offensive form of expression may
not be prohibited to adults, the same latitude does not necessarily apply
to children enrolled in a public school." The Court specifically noted,
"it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse."2 3 The Court
recognized that "[tihe pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech was
offensive to both teachers and students" and considered Fraser's

...

speech to be "acutely insulting to teenage girl students."24 This
decision affirmed the discretionary authority of school officials in the
closed forum of a public school to prohibit speech that is not necessarily
disruptive.25 In light of subsequent court decisions, Frasermay also be
read to allow the censorship of language that the audience may perceive
to be offensive, harassing, or demeaning to a group of students-here
minor females-based on that group's core characteristics. 26
Additionally, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation," the Supreme Court
specifically "recognized an interest in protecting minors from exposure

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

473 U.S. 788 (1985).
Id. at 806.
Id.
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 683.
Id.
See id. at 684.
See id. at 685-86.
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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to vulgar and offensive spoken language."" As such, the Court in
Fraserconcluded the school district was permitted to "imposlel sanctions
upon Fraser in response to his offensively lewd and indecent speech."2 9
The Court noted,
The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as [Fraser's]
would undermine the school's basic educational mission. A high school
assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue
directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.
Accordingly, it was [certainly] appropriate for the school to disassociate
itself to make the point to the [students] that vulgar speech and lewd
conduct is wholly inconsistent with the "fundamental values" of public
school education."o
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier

B.

In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier," a high school principal
chose to eliminate two pages from the student-written school newspaper
because it contained articles dealing with teenage pregnancy and the
impact of divorce on students at school. Specifically, the principal was
concerned that, even though the story used false names to shield the
identity of the pregnant students, other students might still be able to
identify them. In addition, the article made reference to sexual activity
and birth control, which the principal felt might be inappropriate for the
younger students at the school. Because the principal was concerned
that there would not be enough time to make the necessary changes to
the articles to protect the students before the paper was printed, the
principal eliminated the two pages that contained the offending
32
stories.
Suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri on the grounds that the students' First Amendment
rights were violated." The district court denied the students' claims,
noting that it is permissible for school officials to restrain "student[]
speech in activities that are an integral part of the school's educational
function .

28.
29.

.

. so long as their decision has a substantial and reasonable

Fraser,478 U.S. at 684 (citing Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749-50).
Id. at 685.

30. Id. at 685-86.
31. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
32. Id. at 262-64.
33.

Id. at 264.
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basis."0
The district court held that "given the small number of
pregnant students" at the school and the identifying characteristics of
the students noted in the article, the principal's concern was "legitimate
and reasonable."" The district court was in fact concerned with the
effect of the language on the pregnant and younger students and not
with its truth or falsity."
The students appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court." Despite the
newspaper's being "a part of the school adopted curriculum," the court
of appeals noted that the newspaper was also part of the public
forum." As such, school officials were precluded "from censoring its
contents except when necessary to avoid material and substantial
interference with school work or discipline."" Moreover, the court of
appeals recognized that school officials could censor the articles "only if
publication of the articles could [result] in tort liability [against] the
school," including liability for the torts of libel or invasion of privacy.40
Concluding that no tort liability could result, the court of appeals held
that school officials had violated the students' First Amendment
rights.4 '
The school subsequently filed an appeal with the Supreme Court,
which reversed the court of appeals.42 Quoting 71nker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,4 3 the Court recognized that
while students in public schools do not "shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," they can be
punished if school authorities believe the expression "substantially
interfere[s] with the work of the school or impinge[s] upon the rights of

34. Id. (quoting Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1463 (1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Id. (quoting Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1466) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. See id. at 264-65.
37. Id. at 265.
38. Id. (quoting Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1373 (8th Cir.
1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. (quoting Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1374-75) (internal quotation marks omitted)
("The Court of Appeals found 'no evidence in the record that the principal could have
reasonably forecast that the censored articles or any materials in the censored articles
would have materially disrupted classwork or given rise to substantial disorder in the
school.'").
40. Id. at 265-66.
41. Id. at 266.
42. Id.
43. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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other students."' This language is important because it clarifies the
kinds of potentially disruptive language that may be censored-language
that may disrupt the educational experience of students generally, a
specific student, or a specifically identifiable group of students.
The Supreme Court specifically noted that student speech inconsistent
with the school's "basic educational mission" need not be tolerated even
though that same speech could not be censored outside the school
setting.45 The Court recognized that school officials are entitled to
exercise control over modes of student expression-such as school
newspapers-to make sure students learn the lessons the school activity
is designed to teach and that readers are not exposed to inappropriate
material. 46 Therefore, in its capacity as publisher of a school newspa7
per or producer of a school play, a school may "disassociate itself4
from both the type of "speech that would substantially interfere with
[its] work . . . or impinge upon the rights of other students"' and "from
speech that is . . . ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately

researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for
immature audiences.'"4

Recognizing that schools must have the ability to implement high
standards for student speech that takes place in school, the Supreme
Court in Hazelwood noted that schools should consider an intended
audience's "emotional maturity" when allowing students to speak on
sensitive topics.o The Court specifically held that "educators do not
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities
so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns." 1 Thus, the Court concluded that parents, teachers, and
state and local school officials-not the federal courts-are responsible for
the education of youths.52 The First Amendment "requirelsl judicial
intervention to protect students' constitutional rights" only when a
school's decision to censor school-sponsored activities "has no valid

44. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 509) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
45. Id. (quoting Fraser,478 U.S. at 685) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at 271.

47. Id. (quoting Fraser,478 U.S. at 685) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
49. Id.

50. Id. at 272.
51. Id. at 273.
52.

Id.
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Thus, the Court's decision in Hazelwood
educational purpose."sa
provides authority for school officials to ban language that would
potentially affect students to the detriment of their education.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District

C.

The seminal case that heralded the supervisory authority of courts
over school administrators was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District.54 In Tinker the Supreme Court held that
students were unconstitutionally denied their right to freedom of
expression because they were prohibited from wearing black arm bands
to school in protest of the Vietnam War." While this case has been
fully analyzed in other publications, the subsequent decisions in Fraser
and Hazelwood discussed above can only be read as a retreat from
Tinker's requirement of imminent disruption.56
The Court in Tinker recognized "the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct
in the schools."" The Court explained that the "problem lies in the
area where students in the exercise of [their] First Amendment rights
collide with the rules of the school authorities."" Putting aside the
disruption issue, exactly what rights was the Court referencing? In
Tinker the students protesting the Vietnam War "neither interrupted
school activities nor sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives
of others."" The Court again used language relating to the "rights of
others" and "lives of others," which suggests that schools have a duty
to consider the effect of language directed at a specific student or
identifiable group of students; thus, school officials must consider the
context of the language, not just the content. In short, the very breadth
of Tinker necessitated the subsequent Fraserand Hazelwood opinions,
which imposed limitations on the rights of students while giving more
discretion to school officials, thus somewhat reinvigorating the doctrine
of in loco parentis."'

53.

Id.

54. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
55. Id. at 514.
56. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73; Fraser,478 U.S. at 685-86.

57. 393 U.S. at 507.
58.
59.
60.
61.
118-19

Id.
Id. at 514.
See id. at 513-14.
For a discussion of the doctrine of in loco parentis, see Landerv. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114,
(1859). In Lander the trial court instructed the jury that a schoolmaster's authority
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RECENT CASES ADDRESSING STUDENT SPEECH

Federal courts, tasked with determining when a student's First
Amendment right to free speech may conflict with a school official's
discretionary authority to maintain discipline, limit offensive speech, and
provide a nonhostile environment, continue to address new issues. As
school officials become more fearful of being sued, the issue of what
language is permitted in public schools becomes critical, which includes
the questions of whether bullying or harassing language can be-and
more importantly, must be-restricted. In determining the answer to
those questions, the presumption that free speech is a constant,
independent of the forum, does not comport with the incoherence of
constitutional law standards. What may be protected by the First
Amendment in a public square or public college campus is broader than
what is protected by the First Amendment in a grade or high school
setting, both of which contain captive audiences and serve a particular
function.62 As previously discussed, the free speech rights of students
recognized by the Supreme Court in 'Tnker v. Des Moines Independent
School District" were effectively restricted in Hazelwood School District
6
v. Kuhlmeier" and Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.
1 More-

over, because "speech-related injuries may be grievous and deeply
wounding,"' school officials may limit the First Amendment free
speech rights of a student in a closed forum-such as a public
school-when "instances of derogatory and injurious remarks [are]
directed at students' minority status such as race, religion, and sexual
orientation,"' making both the content and context of speech important.

is closely related to that of a parent over a child, and as long as the schoolmaster exercised
good judgment in correcting a student's misconduct, the schoolmaster should not be held
liable for that exercise unless his motives were in bad faith. The trial court further
instructed that even if the jury thought the schoolmaster had administered an excessive
punishment-one beyond what the jury would have done in a similar situation-he could not
be held liable for his error when he acted with good intentions because without the
authority to correct students' misconduct, the business of the school could not be carried
out. Id.
62. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969).
63. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
64. 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988).
65. 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986).
66.

STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH ...

AND IT'S A GOOD

THING Too 109 (1994) (emphasis omitted).
67. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated
as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
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It is not necessarily of much solace that qualified immunity exists for
school officials providing "complete protection for government officials
sued in their individual capacities if their conduct 'does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."" "The purpose of [qualified]
immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary
duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation,
protecting from suit 'all but the plainly incompetent or one who is
knowingly violating the federal law.""'
A.

Harper v. Poway Unified School District

Harper v. Poway Unified School District"o illustrates the current
views about expression and student speech permitted in the public
school setting. A high school student named Tyler Chase Harper
responded to a school sponsored "Day of Silence," which he believed
"endorse[dl, promote[dl and encourage[dl homosexual activity," by
wearing "a T-shirt to school on which 'I WILL NOT ACCEPT WHAT
GOD HAS CONDEMNED,' was handwritten on the front and 'HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL Romans 1:27' was handwritten on the
back."" The day after the "Day of Silence," Harper wore a T-shirt to
school that stated, "BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT
GOD HAS CONDEMNED" on the front, "while the back [read] the same
...

as before, 'HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL Romans 1:27."'"7

On that day, Harper was informed by school officials that the T-shirt he
was wearing violated the school's dress code, and he was asked to
remove the shirt.7 ' After Harper refused, he was counseled by the
school staff on "ways that he and students of his faith could bring a
positive light onto this issue without the condemnation that he displayed
on his shirt."74 The assistant principal explained to Harper that "the
school [was not] promoting homosexuality but rather [the 'Day of
Silence'] was a student activity trying to raise other students' awareness

68. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
69. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (quoting
Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001)).
70. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
71. Id. at 1171 & n.2. The record does not reflect that any school staff saw the T-shirt
on the "Day of Silence." Id. at 1171.
72. Id. at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 1171-72.
74. Id. at 1172 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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regarding tolerance in their judgement [sic] of others."" The principal
explained that he thought the shirt was "inflammatory," that the school
wanted to avoid physical altercations like those that occurred in the
past, and "that it was not healthy for students to be addressed in such
a derogatory manner."7 One of Harper's teachers also stated to him
that the words on the shirt "created a negative and hostile working
environment for others."" Harper continued to refuse to remove the
shirt, and consequently, he was excluded from classes and was required
to remain in a school conference room doing homework for the rest of the
day.78 Harper was visited by a deputy sheriff who was already at the
school, and although Harper's complaint alleged the reason was to
"interrogate" him, the record reflects that the deputy conducted the
conversation "simpl[y out of] curiosity .

.

. to understand the situa-

tion."79
Later in the day, Ed Giles, an assistant principal who had attended
church with Harper's father, spoke with Harper to make sure he was all
right."0 Giles told Harper "he understood 'where he was coming from'
but wished that he could 'express himself in a more positive way."' 8 1
Giles went on to say that he-Giles himself-"had to 'leave his faith in
[the] car,"' and he encouraged Harper to consider other, more positive
and nonconfrontational alternatives.8 2
The plaintiff in Harper argued that the defendants' actions violated
his rights (1) to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution;' (2) to free exercise of religion under the
First Amendment;' (3) to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment;85 (4) to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment;8
and (5) under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.8 In
analyzing Harper's claims, the Ninth Circuit primarily considered three
Supreme Court cases, stating that "It]his court has identified 'three
distinct areas of student speech,' each of which is governed by different

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. (third alteration in original).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1172-73 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1173.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
U.S. CONsT. amend. I, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. amend I, cl. 1.
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Supreme Court precedent: (1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly
offensive speech which is governed by Fraser;(2) school-sponsored speech
which is governed by Hazelwood; and (3) all other speech which is
governed by Tinker."'
As to the plaintiffs First Amendment free speech claim, the court of
appeals relied on Tinker, holding that a student's First Amendment right
is limited by the public school's "special need to maintain a safe, secure
and effective learning environment."' In Tinker the Supreme Court
held that forbidding the wearing of black armbands by students
protesting the Vietnam War was an unconstitutional denial of the
student's free speech rights since the fear of a disturbance was
"undifferentiated," and "apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression."o

In Harper the fear of disturbance was real-not undifferentiated-because some hostile confrontations had occurred on the previous
year's "Day of Silence" as well as on the current year's." Further, the
school principal stated that Harper told him "he had already been
confronted by a group of students on campus and was involved in a tense
verbal conversation earlier that morning."92 Civility was not the issue
because the court in Harper saw no problem with T-shirts proclaiming
The actual
"Young Republicans Suck" or "Young Democrats Suck."
reason the school was permitted to limit Harper's free speech rights was
neither fear of disruption nor deference to the discretion of school
authority; rather, it was the court's concurrence with the principal's
statement that "any shirt which is worn on campus which speaks in a
derogatory manner toward an individual or group of individuals is not
However, the court stipulated that not all
healthy for young people."
Concluding that condemning
such speech could be prohibited."
homosexual activity-a behavior-was the same as condemning homosexuals-a core characteristic-the court stated, "[W]e limit our holding to
instances of derogatory and injurious remarks directed at students'
minority status such as race, religion, and sexual orientation" in a closed
forum such as a public school." In short, the court disapproved of the
self-righteous judgment by a majority directed towards culturally or

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Harper, 445 F.3d at 1176-77 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1176.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
See Harper,445 F.3d at 1171-72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1172 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 1182-83.
Id. at 1181, 1183.
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genetically determined characteristics, stating that "[plublic school
students who may be injured by verbal assaults on the basis of a core
identifying characteristic . .. have a right to . . . 'be secure and to be let

alone.""' After stating that "[the government is generally prohibited
from regulating speech 'when the specific motivating ideology or the
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction,""' the court went on to explain that public schools are "not always
governed by the same rules that apply in other circumstances . . . if the

speech violates the rights of other students or is materially disruptive."99
The Ninth Circuit also cited Hazelwood for the proposition that
"school[s] need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its
Is that mission to teach students
basic educational mission."o
"tolerance in their judgement [sic] of others"'0 ' or to eliminate religious
speech? Harper, after all, was advised to find alternative ways to
address the issue.1 02 The court of appeals in Harper posited that
perhaps the mission comes from the focus of the Supreme Court in
Fraser,which would "permit, and even encourage" public schools to have
"discussions of tolerance, equality and democracy without being required
to provide equal time for student or other speech espousing intolerance,
The dissent posited that political disagreement
bigotry or hatred."'
homosexuality and the fact that the "Day of
of
tolerance
regarding
supplied sufficient reason to allow Harper's
response
a
begged
Silence"
invited political discourse and debate.'04
essentially
it
T-shirt because
The court of appeals held, however, that just because there is indeed
political disagreement that would be acceptable in an open forum, that
disagreement "doles] not justify students in high schools or elementary
schools assaulting their fellow students with demeaning statements: by
calling gay students shameful, by labeling black students inferior or by
wearing T-shirts saying that Jews are doomed to Hell."'o' The court
reasoned, "As long ago as in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme

97. Id. at 1178 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
98. Id. at 1184 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829 (1995)).
99. Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S at 511 (holding that a school may not prohibit one
specific opinion unless it shows constitutionally valid reasons for the prohibition)).
100. Id. at 1185 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
101. Id. at 1172 (alteration in original).
102. Id. at 1189.
103. Id. at 1185 (citing Fraser,478 U.S. at 681).
104. See id. at 1196-97 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1181 (majority opinion).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

420

[Vol. 62

Court recognized that '[al sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a
child to learn."'"o" Moreover, "[ilf a school permitted its students to
wear shirts reading, 'Negros: Go Back to Africa,' no one would doubt that
the message would be harmful to young black students."'0 o
The Ninth Circuit in Harper relied explicitly on Tinker and did not
consider whether the statements on the T-shirt were "'plainly offensive'
under Fraser"'o Thus, the court of appeals was evidently concerned
with the school's authority to "not tolerate student speech that is
inconsistent with its basic educational mission, [ even though the
government could not censor similar speech outside the school."o' The
court of appeals further recognized that because
[plart of a school's "basic educational mission" is the inculcation of
"fundamental values of habits and manners of civility essential to a
democratic society[,]" . . . public schools may permit, and even

encourage, discussions of tolerance, equality and democracy without
being required to provide equal time for student or other speech
espousing intolerance, bigotry or hatred.1 o
Moreover, just "because a school sponsors a 'Day of Religious Tolerance,'
it need not permit its students to wear T-shirts reading, 'Jews Are
Christ-Killers' or 'All Muslims Are Evil Doers."'n" In other words, the
potential effect on fellow students must be considered if the language
involves core identifying characteristics.11 2
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit stated that schools may prohibit
speech not involving physical confrontation when such speech "may well
Because Harper's Timpinge[] upon the rights of other students."1
shirt was "a silent, passive expression of opinion" and would ordinarily
be protected under Tinker's disruption standard," the court of
appeals's focus on the interference with the rights of others intersects

106. Id. at 1180 (alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
494 (1954)).

107. Id.
108. Id. at 1176 n.14.
109. Id. at 1185 (alteration in original) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg'1 Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d
243, 264 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that "[s]tudents cannot hide behind the First Amendment
to protect their 'right' to abuse and intimidate other students at school").
110. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1185 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681).
111. Id.
112. See id. at 1186.
113. Id. at 1177-78 (quoting Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 539
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
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sharply with this particular exercise of religious speech."'5 School
authorities are apparently given great leeway in deciding if speech based
on a student's core characteristics must be restricted if it offends or
criticizes other students or their behavior. Arguably, the court of
appeals determined that Harper's passive expression of disapproval
turned into an active one when it "colli[ded] with the rights of other
students.""'6
Harper's T-shirt interfered with the rights of other students because
its offensive message was implicitly unavoidable."' This speech is an
exception to the rule that speech "may not be curtailed simply because
the speaker's message may be offensive to his audience.""' The Ninth
Circuit emphasized that its holding did "not suggest that all debate as
to issues relating to tolerance or equality may be prohibited."1
Rather, the only question answered was whether "T-shirts, banners, and
other similar items bearing slogans that injure students with respect to
their core characteristics" can be prohibited.120
Based on the decision in Harper, can speech be prohibited if it is
offensive to others generally or generally offensive to a particular
student? What right is being protected? Self-esteem? The right to be
free of a negative emotional reaction to someone else's words? The right
never to have a core characteristic-for example, race, ethnicity, gender,
and sexual preference-questioned or talked about? The right never to
have a behavior associated with a core characteristic commented on?
Perhaps the Supreme Court's holding in Morse v. Frederick"'provides
some guidance for these questions.
B.

Morse v. Frederick

The most recent direction from the Supreme Court on student free
speech can be found in Morse v. Frederick.'22 In Morse a high school
student filed suit, alleging his First Amendment rights had been violated

115. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178.
116. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. See id.; see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (holding that "{tihe
First Amendment permits the government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when
the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech"); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 n.6 (1975) (noting that courts have suggested offensive
language may be prohibited when directed at a captive audience).
118. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000).
119. Harper,445 F.3d at 1186.
120. Id.
121. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
122. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
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because he was suspended from school for waving a banner that stated
"BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" at an outdoor, off-campus, school-sponsored, and
school-supervised event. 12 3 The United States District Court for the
District of Alaska granted the principal's motion for summary judgment,
ruling that the principal had not infringed on Frederick's free speech
rights."' The Ninth Circuit, despite concluding that "the banner
expressed a positive sentiment about marijuana use," reversed the
finding of the district court."' The court concluded that the principal
punished Frederick without demonstrating that Frederick's speech
threatened substantial disruption, and his First Amendment rights had
therefore been violated.126
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth
Circuit.' 7 The question before the Court was "whether a principal
may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a
school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal
drug use."' 2 8 Quoting Tinker, the Court recognized that students and
teachers have First Amendment rights in the school setting.'29 The
school's interest in avoiding the unpleasantness associated with an
unpopular viewpoint "was not enough to justify banning 'a silent, passive
expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance."'130
The Supreme Court then referenced its holding in Fraser,in which the
Court concluded school officials did not violate a student's First
Amendment rights by suspending him when he used an elaborate,
explicit sexual metaphor at a school assembly.13 ' Recognizing "[tihe
mode of analysis employed in Fraser [was] not entirely clear," the Court
reiterated two basic principles: (1) the holding in Fraserrecognizes that
the rights of students in school are not coextensive with those of adults
in other settings, and (2) "the mode of analysis set forth in Tlnker is not
absolute."132 The Court also noted that if Fraser's speech had occurred

123. Id. at 396-97, 399 (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id. at 399.
125. Id.
126. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. at 400, 410.
128. Id. at 403.
129. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506)
130. Id. at 404 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508). But cf., Harper, 445 F.3d at 1171,
1177-78 (holding that a student's wearing of a T-shirt bearing the slogan"HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL" impinged upon rights of other students and could be restricted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
131. Morse, 551 U.S. at 404 (quoting Fraser,478 U.S. at 678).
132. Id. at 404-05.
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outside of the school arena, the speech would have been protected.133
Additionally, the Court recognized that it did not use the "substantial
disruption" analysis set forth in Tinker in analyzing Fraser.1 34 The
Court also referenced its holding in Hazelwood, in which the Eighth
Circuit analyzed the case under Tinker and ruled in favor of the
students because there was no evidence of material disruption.s35 In
Morse the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and reiterated its holding
from Hazelwood-a student's First Amendment rights are not violated
when school officials exercise "control over the style and content of
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.""3 '
However, the Supreme Court in Morse noted that Hazelwood did not
apply because the banner was not school-sponsored, but the Court
acknowledged that its decision in Hazelwood shows that the holding
from "Tinker is not the only basis for restricting student speech."
The Court drew on the principles applied in student speech cases
recognizing that while students "do not shed their constitutional rights
... at the school-house gate," deterring drug use by students in school
is an important-and perhaps even compelling-interest.1 38 Moreover,
the special setting of the school environment, coupled with "the
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse," permits "schools
to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting
illegal drug use.""' While Tinker requires more than an apprehension
of disturbance or a desire to avoid discomfort associated with an
unfavorable viewpoint, the Court distinguished the banner in Morse
because the prevention of drug abuse "extends well beyond an abstract
desire to avoid controversy."14 0 Recognizing school officials have a
difficult and important job, the Court held that once the principal saw
Frederick's banner promoting illegal drug use, she was permitted to
restrict the student's speech as it was in violation of school policy which
prohibited the advocation of illegal drug use.141 The Court concluded
that schools are not required under the First Amendment to tolerate
student speech at school events that contributes to the dangers of illegal

133. Id. at 405.
134. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Id. (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 265).
136. Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273).
137. Id. at 405-06.
138. Id. at 406-07 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Id. at 408.
140. Id. at 408-09 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09).
141. Id. at 409-10.
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drug use."' More generally, the Court seemed to recognize that it had
previously gone far enough, perhaps too far, in limiting the discretionary
authority of school officials to regulate student speech."'
III.

STUDENT SPEECH

Smith v. Greene County School District

A.

In Smith v. Greene County School District,'4 4 a student, after being
reprimanded for an incident on the playground, wore a shirt to school
that stated "KIDS HAVE CIVIL RIGHTS TOO" on the front and "EVEN
ADULTS LIE" on the back."' The student's mother affixed the
lettering to the T-shirt in response to the student's belief that he had
been treated unfairly.'4 The student was suspended after the principal found the student to be "disruptive, unresponsive, surly, and
instigating feelings of discord.""' The student, through his mother,
brought an action in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia, alleging the suspension violated his free speech
rights.14 8
The district court held that the suspension did not violate the
student's First Amendment right to free speech.14 ' The court recognized that the disruption the student "caused by wearing the shirt was
the final act of defiance in a series of acts" that led to Smith's suspenApplying the holding in 71nker v. Des Moines Independent
sion.'
Community School District,1s the court recognized that without facts
that could lead a school official to reasonably "forecast substantial
disruption" or interference with school activities, "[ilt is only where
school officials reasonably believe that a student's uncontrolled exercise
of expression might 'substantially interfere with the work of the school
or impinge upon the rights of other students' that they may restrict such
expression."" 2

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 410.
See id. at 409.
100 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (M.D. Ga. 2000).
Id. at 1357.
Id.
Id. at 1356, 1360 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 1356, 1361-62.
Id. at 1363.
Id.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Smith, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1363-64 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
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The court then distinguished the facts in Tinker from those in Smith
because in Tinker the students were suspended for nothing more than
In conwearing black arm bands in protest of the Vietnam War.'
trast, the suspension in Smith resulted after a number of acts of
defiance, the final one being the wearing of the shirt.154 Thus, the
district court in Smith concluded that the school officials properly
exercised their authority in controlling conduct at school."' Specifically, noting this was not "one of those rare [situations] when federal courts
should 'intervene in the resolution of conflicts that arise in the daily
operation of school systems,"' the court did not find a violation of Smith's
First Amendment right to free speech. "'
Bullying or First Amendment Protected Student Speech
On April 16, 2009, eleven-year-old Jaheem Herrera hung himself with
a belt in the closet of his apartment after allegedly being verbally bullied
by his classmates at Dunaire Elementary School in DeKalb County,
Georgia."' According to Jaheem's mother, she repeatedly complained
to school officials that Jaheem was being threatened and teased by his
Specifically, according to Jaheem's step-father, Jaheem
classmates."
was repeatedly called "gay" and "a snitch."15' Jaheem's mother claims
she went to the school six or seven times to discuss this with school
officials. Unfortunately, the alleged bullying continued, and Jaheem's
family now contends he committed suicide because he was bullied in
B.

school."1o

The DeKalb County School System arguably uses one of the finest
student codes of conduct in the country, and it is often cited as an
example for other schools to follow.'' Whether the acts experienced
by Jaheem in 2009 constitute bullying as defined by the 2010-2011
DeKalb County School System's Code of Student Conduct (Code of

153. Id. at 1364.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
864 (1982)).
157. Lawrence, supra note 1.
158. Kristina Torres, Dekalb School's FinalReport: Bullying Not Key Factor in Boy's
Death, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 26, 2009, http://www.ajc.com/news/dekalb/dekalb-schools
final-report-124646.html?printArticle=y.
159. Gracie Bonds Staples, Bullies at School Took Boy's Life, Family Says, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/news/stories/2009/04/22/bully0422
.html.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
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The Code of Student
Student Conduct)1 62 raises another question."
Conduct now defines bullying, pursuant to the 2010 amendments to
section 20-2-751.4 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.)11 4 as follows:
[Ain act which occurs on school property, on school vehicles, at
designated school bus stops, or at school related functions or activities,
or by use of data or software that is accessed through a computer,
computer system, computer network, or other electronic technology of
a local school system, that is:
(1) Any willful attempt or threat to inflict injury on another person,
when accompanied by an apparent present ability to do so;
(2) Any intentional display of force such as would give the victim
reason to fear or expect immediate bodily harm; or
(3) Any intentional written, verbal, or physical act, which a reasonable
person would perceive as being intended to threaten, harass, or
intimidate, that:
(A) Causes another person substantial physical harm within the
meaning of Code Section 16-5-23.1 or visible bodily harm as such term
is defined in Code Section 16-5-23.1;
(B) Has the effect of substantially interfering with a student's education;
(C) Is so severe, persistent, or pervasive that it creates an intimidating
or threatening educational environment; or
(D) Has the effect of substantially disrupting the orderly operation of
the school.6 s
While O.C.G.A. § 20-2-751.4 provides a broad definition of bullying,
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-145166 focuses on the school's responsibility to develop
a program to encourage character development among its students and
defines positive character traits to include "respect for the creator,"
"respect for others," "kindness," "compassion," and "tolerance."6 7

162. DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM, CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT (2010-2011).
163. Bullying is defined in O.C.G.A. § 20-2-751.4 (2009), which was in effect at the time
of Jaheem's suicide, as follows: "(1) Any willful attempt or threat to inflict injury on
another person, when accompanied by an apparent present ability to do so; or (2) Any
intentional display of force such as would give the victim reason to fear or expect
immediate bodily harm."
164. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-751.4 (Supp. 2010). This section was amended in 2010 to add an
introductory paragraph regarding the scope of the definition of bullying and parts (3)(A)-(D)
were also added. Ga. S. Bill 250, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 516 (codified as amended at
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-751.4 (Supp. 2010)).
165. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-751.4 (Supp. 2010); see also DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM,
CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT 17, 31.

166. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-145 (2009).
167. Id.
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These traits dovetail rather well with the Code of Student Conduct's
prohibition of "harassment."2i 6 8 Additionally, the Code of Student
Conduct says, "A student shall not verbally threaten and/or intimidate
teachers, administrators, bus drivers, other school personnel, other
students, or persons attending school-related functions, with or without
the use of physical contact" if doing so causes a "reasonable [person) fear
of immediate bodily harm (including bullying . .)."161 Even "discourteous or . . . inappropriate language, behavior or gestures, including

vulgar/profane language" is prohibited by the Code of Student Conduct."o The Code of Student Conduct even goes as far as listing
"insulting comments about sexual orientation" as sexual orientation
harassment and further states that "[tihe DeKalb School System will not
tolerate bullying and other forms of harassment and, therefore, reserves
the right to punish students after the first incident and upon a finding
of guilt.""' Thus, the Code of Student Conduct does not merely forbid
bullying in the commonly used sense but also forbids "other forms of
harassment.""' Could the DeKalb County School officials be suggesting that character development is a school responsibility despite the
assertion from Tinker that "state-operated schools may not be enclaves
of totalitarianism"?"a Even with 'nker, what might "substantially
interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other
students"'74 may well be judged by the effect it has on others rather
than by its actual content unless that content is inconsistent with
preventing harassment and intimidation.
In West v. Derby Unified School District,17s the context of student
speech was an issue when the student "drew a picture of the Confederate
flag during class in violation of the school district's harassment and
Based upon past events of racial tension in the
intimidation policy."'
school district, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
recognized the school "had reason to believe that a student's display of
the Confederate flag might cause disruption and interfere with the

168. Compare id., with DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM, CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT
at 23, 31.
169. DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM, CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT at 17.
170. Id. at 18.
171. Id. at 20, 23, 31.
172. Id. at 20.
173. 393 U.S. at 511.
174. Id. at 509.

175. 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000).
176. Id. at 1365.
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rights of other students.""' As in Harper v. Poway Unified School
District,"' there was not an imminent threat of violence in West.'
Returning to the Code of Student Conduct, the issue remains whether
harassing speech without the threat-express or implied-of physical
harm is preventable by school officials either as a practical or legal
matter. Moreover, do students have a cognizable, enforceable right to be
left alone and, in essence, not be harassed? While the Anti-Defamation
League's Public School Initiative "No Place for Hate'"'o seeks to train
faculty and students about diversity and accepting differences, this
training might be seen as an anti-harassment policy that goes beyond
what schools can otherwise censor. As such, what constitutes "hate
speech" seems an ever changing and expanding area as increasing
emphasis is placed on the effect of speech on the listener rather than on
the content of the speech itself.
For example, in addressing the implications of a city including a
nativity scene in its Christmas display, Justice O'Connor noted in her
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,'8 ' "The central issue in this case is
whether [the City] has endorsed Christianity by its [actions]. To answer
that question, we must examine both what [the City] intended to
communicate

. . . and what message the City's display actually

conveyed."' 82 Must the government representative be charged with
knowing the psychological effect of language used by students when
referring to other students? For what purpose should such language be
forbidden? And is there a different standard if the language is directed
at a specific student rather than a group of students? After all, the
Supreme Court found no problem with T-shirts proclaiming "Young
Republicans Suck" or 'Young Democrats Suck."" The Court, however,
did find a problem with derogatory remarks made toward gay students
because the remarks were injurious and directed at a particular
student's minority status.184
In Saxe v. State College School District,' a case decided after
86 and Hazelwood
Tinker, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,1

177.
178.
179.
180.
(2009).
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 1366.
445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
See 206 F.3d at 1366.
See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, No PLACE FOR HATE: CLASSROOM RESOURCE GUIDE
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 690.
Harper, 445 F.3d at 1182.
See id. at 1182-83; see also supra text accompanying notes 71-91.
240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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School District v. Kuhlmeier,17 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that the anti-harassment policy adopted by the
school district was overly broad and therefore violated the First
Amendment rights of the students.'18 The policy asserted that its goal
was to "provid[e] all students with a safe, secure, and nurturing school
environment" and admonished "that [d]isrespect among members of the
school community is unacceptable behavior which threatens to disrupt
the school environment and well being of the individual."'8 ' The policy
specifically defined harassment as
verbal or physical conduct based on one's actual or perceived race,
religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or
other personal characteristics, and which has the purpose or effect of
substantially interfering with a student's educational performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment....
. ..

Harassment can include any unwelcome verbal, written or

physical conduct which offends, denigrates or belittles an individual
because of any of the characteristics described above. Such conduct
includes, but is not limited to, unsolicited derogatory remarks, jokes,
demeaning comments or behaviors, slurs, mimicking, name calling,
graffiti, innuendo, gestures, physical contact, stalking, threatening,
bullying, extorting or the display or circulation of written material or
pictures. "
The examples of harassment set forth by the school district in Saxe
went well beyond verbal or physical conduct based on core or immutable
characteristics-such as gender, sexual orientation, race, color, religion,
ethnicity, disability, and intellect-by including "clothing, appearance,
The court noted,
hobbies and values, and social skills."'
Insofar as the policy attempts to prevent students from making
negative comments about each others' "appearance," "clothing," and
"social skills," it may be brave, futile, or merely silly. But attempting
to proscribe negative comments about "values," as that term is
commonly used today, is something else altogether. By prohibiting
disparaging speech directed at a person's "values," the Policy strikes at
the heart of moral and political discourse-the lifeblood of constitutional

187.
188.

484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217.

189. Id. at 202 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. Id. at 202-03.
191. Id. at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that sexual orientation is an immutable
characteristic).
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self government (and democratic education) and the core concern of the
First Amendment.19 2
Perhaps this case is analogous to the ever memorable incident at
Columbine wherein much of what the murderers-Eric Harris and Dylan
Klebold-claimed as harassment and motivation for their rampage was
the persistent teasing about their clothing, hairstyles, and other
behaviors not generally under the school's control but certainly under
the perpetrators control. 193
In an opinion that more closely adhered to the substantial disruption
standard in Tinker, the Third Circuit in Saxe recognized that restricting
speech based solely on its secondary or emotive effect rather than as a
prelude to forbidden behavior is impermissible under the First Amendment.194 It is not the expression that is prohibited but the "nonexpressive qualities" that promote an unlawful end such as discrimination.1 9 5 Citing Boos v. Barry,9 6 the court of appeals reasoned that
[tihe Supreme Court has made it clear, however, that the government
may not prohibit speech under a "secondary effects" rationale based
solely on the emotive impact that its offensive content may have on a
listener: "Listeners' reactions to speech are not the type of 'secondary
effects' we referred to in Renton . ...

The emotive impact of speech on

its audience is not a 'secondary effect.'"'
The court of appeals in Saxe further recognized that a restriction of
expressive speech based on the audience's reaction is not content-neutral
and cannot be defined "as a mere 'time, place, and manner' regulation.""
Thus, the court of appeals arguably backed off the captive
audience argument, an interesting result in light the Harper and West
opinions.
In Saxe the students objecting to the anti-harassment statute wanted
to be free "to speak out about the sinful nature and harmful effects of
homosexuality," to discuss their religious objections, and to distribute
religious literature."
The Third Circuit stated that

192. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 210.
193. See Nancy Gibbs & Timothy Roche, The Columbine Tapes, TIME, Dec. 20, 1999,
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,992873,00.html.
194. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 209.
195. Id. at 208.
196. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).

197. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 209 (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 203.
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prohibiting disparaging speech directed at a person's "values" . . .
strikes at the heart of moral and political discourse-the lifeblood of
constitutional self government (and democratic education) and the core
concern of the First Amendment. That speech about "values" may
offend is not cause for its prohibition, but rather the reason for its
protection: "a principal 'function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.'"2 oo
The speech addressed by the court of appeals in Saxe is distinguishable
from that in Harper because Harper was only prohibited from demeaning and disparaging his fellow students.201 In essence, the school had
an interest in restricting any student speech when the result harassed
or provoked rather than invited discourse, and this type of school
censure follows the reasoning of West.2 02
In the Georgia case involving Jaheem Herrera, students calling
Jaheem a "snitch" and using the term "gay" to denigrate and condemn
him is hardly an invitation to discourse. The context-that is, the
manner, time, and place-was crucial. After Jaheem's suicide, DeKalb
County school officials commenced an internal review surrounding the
events, and the attorney representing Jaheem's family filed an intent to
sue the DeKalb County School System on May 12, 2009.203 Some
former teachers stated they did not witness the alleged bullying. 204
After conducting an investigation, former Superior Court Judge Thelma
Wyatt Cummings Moore concluded that Jaheem's suicide was not the
result of wrongdoing by the staff at Dunaire Elementary School.2 05
Specifically, the investigation concluded that Jaheem was not bullied
more than any other studentS206 and that by calling Jaheem "gay,"
students meant that he was "happy."20 7
With little guidance from the courts, school administrators are left
with the conflict between a student's right to free speech and the school's

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 210 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989)).
Harper, 445 F.3d at 1186.
See 206 F.3d 1358.
Kristina Torres, DeKalb Schools Report Aims to Detail Bullying Case Wednesday,
ATLANTA J. CONST., May 19, 2009, http://www.ajc.com/news/dekalb-schools-report-aims
7882.html.
204. Id.
205. Torres, supra note 203.
206. Id.
207. Dyana Bagby, Governor to Sign Anti-Bullying Bill Today, GA. VOICE, May 27,
2010, http://thegavoice.com/index.php/blog/politics-menu/441 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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interest in maintaining a safe learning environment.
In Jaheem
Herrera's case, he was allegedly called "gay" and a "snitch" routinely.
If the officials at Jaheem's school had suspended the bullying students,
would the alleged bullies have claimed that their First Amendment right
to free speech had been violated? Also, would a Georgia court apply
Tinker and require a finding of evidence of a material and substantial
interference with school work or discipline? Or would the court, as in
Harper, consider the use of the word "gay" to be harmful to other
students seeking to obtain a fair and equal education?
Perhaps Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie School District No. 204 Board of
Education2 0 8 can provide some guidance. In Zamecnik a group of
students professed sincere Christian religious beliefs in protest of a "Day
of Silence" sponsored by the school's Gay/Straight Alliance by wearing
a T-shirt the day after the "Day of Silence" that read "Be Happy, Not
Gay."209 School officials required the students to cross out the "Not
Gay" part on the T-shirt and refused to "permit negative statements that
are derogatory of homosexuals" to be used.2"
The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that one of
the school officials did not violate the student's free speech rights when
the official prohibited the student from wearing the T-shirt with the
complete slogan.2 1 ' Perhaps the slogan incited rather than invited
discourse, thereby making it censorable.2 12
Recognizing the holding in Morse v. Frederick,21 3 the district court
in Zamecnik noted that Morse "did not change the scope of Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District and its progeny."2 14
Quoting Doninger v. Niehoff,215 the district court recognized that
there is "no question that teaching students the values of civility and
respect for the dignity of others is a legitimate school objective" and

that this objective can be a basis for restricting student speech even
when the speech is not vulgar or offensive in the Frasersense, at least
(as in the present case) when the student is not otherwise being
punished.2 1 6

But what about speech questioning values?

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

619 F. Supp. 2d 517 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
Id. at 520 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 521.
See supra text accompanying notes 102-07.
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
619 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (citation omitted).
514 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Conn. 2007).
Zamecnik, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (quoting Doninger, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 215).
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The district court also noted that the decision in Hazelwood does not
control the outcome in Morse; the district court in Zamecnik reasoned
that to the contrary, Hazelwood is "instructive" because Justice Alito's
concurrence "expressly states that Morse leaves open the question of
whether there are any other grounds for restricting speech beyond those
recognized in Tinker, Fraser, [Hazelwood], and now Morse."'2 17 Thus,
the court concluded that the student's First Amendment rights to free
speech were not violated."'8 The school official was entitled to restrict
the harmful student speech in light of one of the school's educational
functions-that is, teaching civility and respect.219 Restricting the
content was permissible, and it left the final decision up to the school
officials.22 0
A timeline from Tinker (1969) to Morse (2007) indicates a retreat by
the Supreme Court from a highly restrictive view of public school
officials' discretion to a redirection that perhaps school officials-not
courts-are better able to judge what restrictions need to be imposed on
a rather immature, captive audience seeking-or at least needing-some
education, training, and adult guidance. In sum, school officials may
censor speech that is (1) reasonably thought to be disruptive or to lead
to disruption even if only meant as an invitation to discourse (hence,
ordinarily non-censorable); (2) inappropriate in the closed forum of a
public school; (3) uncivil, demeaning, or disrespectful; (4) meant to
harass, intimidate, or bully regardless of its truth content; or (5)
violative of the rights of others. The last is a rather amorphous
standard, and the use of the word "rights" implies that schools must deal
with such speech. It also suggests that speech otherwise not censorable
can be censored depending on the context as well as the content of the
speech.
Consequently, is there a right to be left alone, to be free from
emotional attack, and to be protected from attacks on one's core
If these rights exist, do school officials have an
characteristics?
enforceable duty to protect these rights? Is a failure to do so actionable?
Given that the Supreme Court has used the language of "rights" in
discussing a school's ability to prohibit certain kinds of student speech,
and that states such as Georgia have passed laws suggesting a
22
reinvigoration of the doctrine of parens patriae, ' has it become

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 525 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 524-25.
Id.
Id. at 525.
See O.C.G.A. § 20-2-751.4 (Supp. 2010).
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mandatory, with possible tort liability imposed against noncompliance,
for public schools to become in loco parentis?
IV.

PUBLIC SCHOOL LIABILITY THEORIES

Assuming that a state's sovereign immunity does not provide a defense
or is waived, theories of public school liability for injuries resulting from
bullying or harassment may be based on the custodial relationship
between school officials and students, which includes a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983,222 the doctrine of in loco parentis, a violation of Title
IX,223 a violation of a student's equal protection rights, or a combination of these theories. Whether a special relationship between a school
and its students exists in any specific instance may be found within
these theories of liability.
A.

42 U.S.C.

.§ 1983

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
lelvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States .. . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
In Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,22 4 the Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals judgment that affirmed the district court's
dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that alleged a kindergarten
student was repeatedly subjected to bullying of a sexual nature by a
third grade student on the school bus.225 Recognizing "that Title IX
was not meant to be an exclusive mechanism for addressing gender
discrimination in schools, or a substitute for § 1983 suits as a means of
enforcing constitutional rights," the Court held "that § 1983 suits based
on the Equal Protection Clause remain available to plaintiffs alleging
unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools."2 16
In Pagano v. Massapequa Public Schools,227 a student brought an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging seventeen separate incidents of
student-on-student harassment during his fifth and sixth grade years of

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2006).
129 S. Ct. 788 (2009).
Id. at 792-93.
Id. at 797.
714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. N.Y. 1989).
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school.22 In ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the
student's seventeen reported incidents and the school's failure to take
preventative action were more than a single act of negligence and may
"rise to the level of deliberate indifference to an affirmative duty."22 9
The district court analogized Pagano to Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services,"o a Second Circuit case, and distinguished
Pagano from DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
23123
Services,2a
a Supreme Court case.2 32 Like the victim in Doe, the
minor in Pagano was in foster care, and "the victim and the [harassers]
were under the care of the school in its parentis patriaecapacity at the
time [the] alleged incidents occurred." 233
In reviewing the substantive due process claim, the Supreme Court in
DeShaney relied on the theory behind the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which "was intended to prevent government
'from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression"' and not to protect people from each other.234 The district court
in Pagano distinguished DeShaney, in which the Department of Social
Services returned a young child to his biological father after having the
child in temporary custody.2 35 In Pagano the district court recognized
that there may be a special relationship between the state, which had
control, and the complaining student; thus, the court seemed to be
relying on the doctrine of parens patriae.23 6

B.

In Loco Parentis

The doctrine of in loco parentis provides immunity for school officials
and teachers acting in that capacity for acts of negligence unless willful
or malicious conduct can be shown.2 37 In Justice Thomas's concurring
opinion in Morse, he explained that "the history of public education
suggests that the First Amendment ... does not protect student speech

228. Id. at 642.
229. Id. at 643.
230. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981).
231. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
232. Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 643.
233. Id.
234. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (alteration in original) (quoting Davidson v. Cannon,
474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986)).
235. Pagano,714 F. Supp. at 643 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189).
236. Id.
237. See Fustin v. Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 2, 242 N.E.2d 308, 312 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1968).
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Through in loco parentis, courts historically
in public schools."'
"upheld the right of schools to discipline students, to enforce rules, and
to maintain order."' Justice Thomas further reasoned that "[iun light
of the history of American public education, it cannot seriously be
suggested that the First Amendment 'freedom of speech' encompasses a
student's right to speak in public schools."24 0 Because courts have
routinely deferred to the school's authority to make rules and to
discipline students for violating those rules, merely relying on the in loco
parentis status does not in itself establish a custodial relationship.
In L.R. ex rel. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
School,241 female plaintiffs alleged they were physically, sexually, and
verbally molested by male students in a school bathroom and darkroom
several times per week.242 Arguing that because the government
legally compelled their attendance at schools, and that the state
legislature granted school officials in loco parentis status, the plaintiffs
claimed the State assumed a custodial relationship that imposed an
affirmative duty to protect the plaintiffs from harassment.24 3 The
Third Circuit concluded that the statute granting principals and
teachers in loco parentis status merely granted authority to school
officials to exercise "only such control as is reasonably necessary to
prevent infractions of discipline and interference with the educational
process."24 4 The court of appeals specifically recognized that in loco
parentis grants authority to the school officials rather than imposing a
duty upon them.245
Other circuits have also rejected the argument that a school's in loco
parentis status gives rise to a custodial relationship and, implicit
therein, some form of liability.24 6 In fact, the Supreme Court in
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton24 1 specifically stated, "While we
do not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general matter have

238.
239.

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410-11 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 413.

240. Id. at 419.
241. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992).
242. Id. at 1366.
243. Id. at 1371 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200).
244. Id. (quoting Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 (W.D. Pa. 1971)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
245. Id. (quoting Pa. State Educ. Ass'n v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 449 A.2d 89, 92 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1982)).
246. See, e.g., Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68, 71-72 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch.
Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993).
247. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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such a degree of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional
'duty to protect,' we have acknowledged that for many purposes 'school
and indeed the duty to
authorities ac[t] in loco parentis,' with the power
248
'inculcate the habits and manners of civility."'

C. 'itle IX
Title IX affords plaintiffs an action for private damages against
recipients receiving federal funds who "act[] with deliberate indifference
to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities" and when the
harassment "is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it
effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or
benefit."24 Title IX imposes liability on school boards because a board
maintains disciplinary authority over its students and can therefore
"exercise[] significant control over" a harassing student.s 0
To meet the deliberate indifference standard, plaintiffs must show
more than mere negligence. 251 Deliberate indifference is not a hindsight inquiry.25 2 However, funding recipients with actual knowledge
Courts find
of student-on-student harassment have a duty to act."
"is
response
failed
or
response
recipient's
the
funding
when
liability
25 4
Neglicircumstances."'
the
known
of
in
light
unreasonable
clearly
gence rises to deliberate indifference when a school has knowledge of
multiple incidents of harassment and fails to take preventative measures."
248. Id. at 655 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S.
at 199-200 (1989); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681, 684
(1986)).
249. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
250. Id. at 630, 646 (holding a school board liable under Title IX because the alleged
misconduct occurred on the school's premises during school hours).
251. Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 74 (1st Cir. 2007). In Porto the court
held that allowing one special education student to use the restroom and excusing the
other to his locker when they had a known off-and-on sexual relationship with one another
was merely negligent. Id. at 70-71, 74. To prove the deliberate indifference standard, the
plaintiff needed to prove the teacher knew that by failing to accompany the complaining
student, the plaintiff would follow the other boy to the restroom and that there was a high
risk of a sexual encounter. Id. at 74.
252. Id. at 74.
253. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648; Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist.,
511 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir. 2008). In Rost the Tenth Circuit held that merely alleging
that male classmates bothered a complaining student was insufficient to provide actual
knowledge of sexual harassment. 511 F.3d at 1119. According to the court of appeals,
failing to investigate generalized complaints does not give rise to Title IX liability. Id.
254. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
255. Doe ex. rel. A.N. v. E. Haven Bd. of Educ., 200 F. App'x 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2006);
Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 643 (holding that a complaint alleging seventeen separate
incidents of harassment and also alleging that school authorities failed to take preventative
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In Doe ex. rel. A.N. v. East Haven Board of Education,256 the plaintiff's classmates called her names and harassed her during school after
discovering she was a rape victim. 25 7 Applying the "clearly unreasonable" standard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that responding to plaintiff's sexual harassment five weeks
after receiving knowledge was "clearly unreasonable," thereby rising to
the level of deliberate indifference.258
To avoid meeting the deliberate indifference standard, a school need
only take reasonable preventative action.2 5 9 The "clearly unreasonable" standard does not "require funding recipients to 'remedy' peer
harassment" or to make sure students obey certain rules.o Under
Title IX, funding recipients need only "respond to known peer harassIn Doe v.
ment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable."'
Bellefonte Area School District,"' a high school student's peers sexually harassed him as a result of his purported effeminate characteristics.
The school had knowledge of the harassment and took preventative
action by giving warnings, counseling and suspending students, allowing
the complaining student to report incidents to the school's psychologist,
and providing the faculty written notice to report harassment against
the complaining student.2 63 The plaintiffs claimed that the school's
"method of dealing with specific, identified perpetrators was not 100%
effective in stemming the harassment."264
The Third Circuit in Bellefonte held that although the harassment
continued, the school was not deliberately indifferent because each
subsequent incident of harassment on the complaining student involved
a student that was not involved in previously reported incidents.2 65
Severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive student-on-student sexual
harassment can range from "overt, physical deprivation of access to

action, survived a motion to dismiss); see Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
256. 200 F. App'x 46 (2d Cir. 2006).
257. Id. at 47-48. The plaintiff testified, "A lot of people were calling me a slut, saying
I slept with two boys. Just nasty names.... A slut, a liar, a bitch, a whore." Id. at 48
(omission in original).
258. Id. at 49.
259. See Doe v. Bellefonte Area Sch. Dist., 106 F. App'x 798, 799 (3d Cir. 2004).
260. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648, 667 (citing UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991)).
261. Id. at 648-49.
262. 106 F. App'x 798 (3d Cir. 2004).
263. Id. at 799-800.
264. Id. at 799.
265. Id. at 799-800; see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 648 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(disapproving of a standard that would force funding recipients to suspend or expel "every
student accused of misconduct").
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school resources" to conduct that "detracts from [a student's] educational
experience. 266 Whether conduct amounts to "harassment" under Title
IX "depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships," such as "the ages of the harasser and the
victim and the number of individuals involved."26 7 Title IX damages
are not available "for simple acts of teasing and name-calling among
school children" because "students often engage in insults, banter,
teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is upsetting
to the students [who are] subjected to it."26 8
In Davis the Supreme Court held that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit erred in dismissing the petitioner's
complaint, given that the female victim alleged repeated acts of sexual
harassment by her fifth grade classmate that not only involved verbal
harassment but also included several incidents of offensive touching
occurring over a five-month period. 269 The complaint stated that the
harassing classmate "rubbed his body against" the complaining student
and "attempted to touch [herl breasts and genital area and made vulgar
statements such as 'I want to get in bed with you' and 'I want to feel
your boobs."' 27 0 The complaint also stated that the classmate "placed
a door stop in his pants and proceeded to act in a sexually suggestive
manner toward [the complaining student].271 Because the harassment
continued for at least five months before the school board responded, the
Court held that the conduct alleged in the complaint satisfied the
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" standard.272 Thus, if the
bullying is severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, the school
seemingly has a duty to protect the student being bullied under Title IX.
Finally, the Constitution imposes an affirmative duty to provide
adequate protection when a "special relationship" exists between the

266. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650-51 (holding that to recover under Title IX, the "plaintiff
must establish sexual harassment of students that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the victims' educational experience,
that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institution's resources and
opportunities").
267. Id. at 651 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82
(1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
268. Id. at 651-52.
269. Id. at 653.
270. Id. at 633-34.
271. Id. at 634.
272. Id. at 633, 649. Compare id., with Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights,
315 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the complaining child's allegations that
her classmate "'bothered' her by doing 'nasty stuff" was "so vague and unspecific that it
cannot provide a basis to determine whether that conduct was severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive harassment").
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The Supreme Court recognized
state and a specific individual.'
custody as a special relationship states may create or assume by
affirmatively restraining an individual's liberty in a manner that
"renders him unable to care for himself, and [by failing] to provide for
his basic human needs [namely], food, clothing, shelter, medical care,

and reasonable safety. 2 74

In Youngberg v. Romeo,2 " the mother of a mentally disabled adult
filed a civil rights action against a Pennsylvania institution for the
mentally retarded. Romeo was a thirty-three year old man who was
unable to care for himself and whose mother was also unable to care for
him and control his violence. After Romeo was involuntarily committed
to the state institution, he suffered self-inflicted injuries and injuries by
acts of others at least sixty-three times. The complaint alleged that the
state institution knew or should have known about Romeo's injuries and
thereby violated his constitutional rights by failing to take preventive
measures.27 6
This was a case of first impression for the Supreme Court regarding
the substantive rights of involuntarily committed mentally disabled
persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. 7' The Court identified
three liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause: (1) safety or
personal security when one is lawfully confined, (2) freedom of movement
or freedom from bodily restraint, and (3) receiving the "'habilitation' or
training necessary to preserve those basic self-care skills."2, 7 None of
these liberty interests are absolute.2 79
To determine whether a state violated a substantive right protected
by the Due Process Clause, a court must "balance 'the liberty of the
individual' and 'the demands of an organized society."' 2 " A trial court
or jury should not arbitrarily apply this balancing test. 28' To properly
balance "the legitimate interests of the State and the rights of the
involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of safety and freedom
from unreasonable restraints," a court need only find "that professional
judgment ... was exercised" rather than adjudicate what methods are

273. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197-98.
274. Id. at 200.
275. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
276. Id. at 309-10.
277. Id. at 314.
278. Id. at 315-16, 327.
279. Id. at 319-20.
280. Id. at 320 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
281. Id. at 321.
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proper.2 82 In Youngberg the State had a duty to provide the patient
the training that a reasonable professional would provide to ensure the
According to the Supatient's safety and freedom of movement. 8
preme Court, "Persons who have been involuntarily committed are
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement
than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to
punish."2 84 As such, schools may have a duty to protect students from
bullying based on the custodial relationship between the school and the
students and may be liable for failing to meet that duty.
V.

CYBERBULLYING AND THE SCHOOLS

Cyberbullying involves the use of modern communications technology
to harass, psychologically attack, or threaten another.2" Harassment
might involve the spreading of lies or attacking someone on the basis of
one's core characteristics with the intent to cause psychological harm
and to disrupt one's life activities. Because cyberbullying is most
commonly associated with preteens and teenagers, the life activity most
Cyberbullying
often disrupted by cyberbullying is education.2 8 6
accompanied by threats of physical harm may effectively be dealt with
as an assault and may also constitute a tort."' These out-of-school
remedies, however, offer little help to a targeted student. School
authorities may feel compelled to act; however, if the cyberbullying is
unaccompanied by physical threats-particularly if it is initiated offcampus-the school authorities might implicate the First Amendment in
seeking to have the cyberbullying restricted.2 " Social networking
websites allow students to interact with their peer groups and with the
public at large without much limit. In fact, the internet has been called
"the digital communication backbone of teens' daily lives."

282. Id. (citing Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir. 1980)).
283. Id. at 324.
284. Id. at 321-22.
285. See Cyberbulling,NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL (Oct. 25,2010,3:30 PM),
http://www.ncpc.org/cyberbullying.
286. See School Bullying Affects Majority of ElementaryStudents, Sd. DAILY (Apr. 12,

2007), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/04/070412072345.htm.
287. See Allison Virginia King, Constitutionalityof Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 854-55
(2010) (discussing the ineffectiveness of tort law in addressing cyberbullying).
288. See Karly Zande, When the School Bully Attacks in the Living Room: Using Tinker
to Regulate Off-Campus Student Cyberbullying, 13 BARRY L. REV. 103, 120-21 (2009).
289.

ROBIN M. KOWALSKI ET AL., CYBER BULLYING: BULLYING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 3

(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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As a result of the prevalent use of the internet, a number of states
have enacted anti-cyberbullying statutes.2 9 0 Whether such statutes
will be effective and can withstand First Amendment challenges is yet
to be decided. Whether school officials may intervene and punish
cyberbullies who affect the education of others, based upon schools'
broadening discretionary authority as set forth in the Supreme Court
cases previously discussed, remains at issue. Taking into consideration
the holding in Morse v. Frederick,21 1 although disciplinary action was
permitted in that case by a school principal for speech by a student
standing off-campus, the Court's rationale was based on the fact that the
students exposed to the drug-encouraging banner were engaged in a
school-sponsored activity and were subject to school supervision.292
The consequences of cyberbullying are often exhibited at school even
if the offending student or students choose not to exhibit the particular
communication at school. These consequences are foreseeable and
interfere with the targeted student's right to be left alone or to have his
or her liberty interest protected.2 93 The courts have recognized the
"secondary responsibility" of school officials to control the school's
Various court decisions, however, have limited the
environment.9
right to punish students no matter how disruptive or educationally
harmful their speech is if it originated off-campus or was brought on
campus by a third party."
In Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board,"' the issue facing the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was whether offcampus speech that was not intended to be communicated on school
grounds, but was inadvertently taken to school nevertheless, subjects the
student speaker to disciplinary action.' 9 The speech in Porter consisted of a sketch "depicting the school under a state of siege" and various
written threats and racial epithets." The court recognized it was not

290. See Zande, supra note 288, at 104 n.3.
291. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
292. See supra text accompanying notes 123-43.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 277-79; see also Kara D. Williams, Note, Public
Schools vs. MySpace & Facebook: The Newest Challenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U.
CIN. L. REv. 707, 730-31 (2008) (stating that "[sIchool officials have admitted to not
knowing what students' speech rights are," especially as applied to social networking sites
and other cyberspeech).
294. See, e.g., C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 183 (3d Cir. 2005).
295. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050
(2d Cir. 1979) (offensive student newspaper distributed off-campus).
296. 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2005).
297. Id. at 611.
298. Id.
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foreseeable that the student's younger brother would bring the sketchpad containing the sketch to school.299 Both brothers were disciplined.a0 o In deciding the action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,3o' the court opined that the speech was neither a campus
speech nor directed at the campus.3 o2 The court concluded that the
school administrators overreacted.3 3 The court held that there was no
intended communication, and that it was-as previously pointed out-not
foreseeable that this speech would be communicated. 0 4
In typical school-age cyberbullying, the perpetrator intends to
communicate the message to both the target and to third persons. The
message is intended to be harmful and to interfere with the targeted
student's functioning. In Porterthe Fifth Circuit reviewed the case law
dealing with off-campus speech brought on campus, in which school
authorities disciplined students under the Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District3 05 disruption standard.0 '
The Tinker standard is not the only standard applicable by school
officials in meting out discipline for speech that is vulgar or offensive
and speech that interferes with the rights of another-for example,
language that disparages a person on the basis of core characteristics. 307 If, as the Ninth Circuit in Harper v. Poway Unified School

299. Id.
300. Id. at 612.
301. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
302. Porter,393 F.3d at 615.
303. See id. at 615-18.
304.

Id. at 618.

305. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
306. Id. at 615 n.22 (citing LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.
2001) ("analyzing student poem composed off-campus and brought onto campus by the
composing student under Tinker"); Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134
F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998) ("student disciplined for an article printed in an underground
newspaper that was distributed on school campus"); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist.,
475 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (5th Cir. 1973) ("student punished for authoring article printed in
underground newspaper distributed off-campus, but near school grounds"); Killion v.
Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) ("student disciplined
for composing degrading top-ten list distributed via e-mail to school friends, who then
brought it onto campus; author had been disciplined before for bringing top-ten lists onto
campus"); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415,92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000)
("applying Tinker to mock obituary website constructed off-campus"); Beussink v. Woodland
R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179 (E.D. Mo. 1998) ("student disciplined for article
posted on personal internet site"); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1389
(D. Minn. 1987) ("student disciplined for writing article that appeared in an underground
newspaper distributed on school campus")).
307. See supra notes 8-11, 21-25, 52.
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Districtas held, a student's First Amendment right is limited by a
public school's "special need to maintain a safe, secure and effective
learning environment,"so would cyberbullying not, per Virginia v.
Black,a1 o be a "true threat"?" Moreover, would it not be an attempt
3 12
the Supreme Court
to intimidate? In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
provided that a state may punish words "which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."313
While the decisions in Black and Chaplinksy dealt with a threat or
apprehension of physical harm, the federal courts have used the
language of rights to describe a right to be left alone" and a right to
educational access when provided for under a state's constitution.
If there is such a right, then school officials have a duty to enforce that
right."' In Black a cross-burning was meant to intimidate, and it was
foreseeable that it would, in fact, intimidate.1 Similarly, cyberbullying often has the same effect, and when engaged in by school-age
children, it is intended to be effective on-campus. The "carried on
campus" requirement, rather than necessarily involving a physical
carrying on, may be satisfied by the intent to have the electronic
communication accessible and the intent to affect the targeted student
in school.a1

308. 445 F.3d 1166 (2006).
309. Id. at 1176.
310. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
311. See id. at 359.
312. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
313. Id. at 572.
314. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
741 (1996) ("[Glovernment may directly regulate speech to address extraordinary
problems."); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-17 (1983) (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Branders, J., dissenting), overruled by Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)).
315. There is no federal constitutional right to an education. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 221 (1982) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)).
Some state statutes, however, provide education up to a certain age as a fundamental
right. See, e.g., 16A C.J.S. Constitutional § 736 (2010) (discussing cases reviewing state
decisions). Note the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975,
42 U.S.C. ch. 75 (2006), as amended by Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, 20 U.S.C § ch. 30 (2006), which establishes a statutory right to a free appropriate
public education for disabled children if a state accepts federal government funds.
316. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional§ 736.
317. 538 U.S. at 344.
318. See Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing
United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 831-32 (10th Cir. 1986)); Hawaii v. Chung, 862 P.2d
1063, 1071-73 (1993)) (off-campus written letters containing violent rants carried oncampus and displayed to the targeted students).
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Consider Doninger v. Neihoff,"' in which the Second Circuit, citing

Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v. Fraser,a"opointed out once again that
"the constitutional rights of students in public schools 'are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."'3 21 Citing
Tinker, the court of appeals further recognized that a student's rights
are to "be applied in a manner consistent with the 'special characteristics of the school environment.'"32 2 The court noted,
The Supreme Court has yet to speak on the scope of a school's
authority to regulate expression that, like Avery's, does not occur on
school grounds or at a school-sponsored event. We have determined,
however, that a student may be disciplined for expressive conduct, even
conduct occurring off school grounds, when this conduct "would
foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school
environment," at least when it was similarly foreseeable that the offcampus expression might also reach campus. We are acutely attentive
in this context to the need to draw a clear line between student activity
that "affects matter of legitimate concern to the school community,"
and activity that does not. But as Judge Newman accurately observed
some years ago, "territoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in
determining the limit of [school administrators'] authority." True
enough in 1979, this observation is even more apt today, when students
both on and off campus routinely participate in school affairs, as well
as in other expressive activity unrelated to the school community, via
blog postings, instant messaging, and other forms of electronic
communication. It is against this background that we consider
whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that
Doninger failed to demonstrate a clear likelihood of success on the
merits of her First Amendment claim.3 23
It seems that the standard set forth in Fraseris as applicable as the

Tinker standard. The Supreme Court in Fraser cited Justice Black's
dissent in Tinker, wherein Justice Black said, "I wish therefore, . . . to
disclaim any purpose ...

to hold that the Federal Constitution compels

319. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
320. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
321. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48 (quoting Fraser,478 U.S. at 682).
322. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
323. Id. at 48-49 (alteration in original) (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the
Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007); Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1058 n.13
(Newman, J., concurring in the result)); see also Lowery v. Euverand, 497 F.3d 584, 596
(6th Cir. 2007); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding
that school officials may act if they reasonably expect disruption).
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the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of
the American public school system to public school students."324
Cyberbullying undermines the fundamental values of a school
education, a result that is both intended and foreseeable. It is also
foreseeable that off-campus communications via the internet will affect
in-school behavior and are intended to do so. The mere fact that a
student's conduct in posting a video clip occurred entirely off-campus
does not preclude a school from disciplining that student for cyberbullying.325 As such, cyberbullying must now be considered in evaluating
bullying and students' right to free speech.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As the individuals responsible for maintaining an environment
conducive to education and learning, "[s] chool principals have a difficult
job, and a vitally important one."326 But those principals, ever fearful
of being sued, are now routinely tasked with protecting and providing a
safe learning environment while also being forced to take into account
a student's First Amendment right to free speech. Although the
Supreme Court has retreated from the Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
3 27
Community School District
standard of imminent disruption before
school authorities can act, it is past time for courts to explicitly recognize
that school-age children are biologically less able to control or recognize
the consequences of their words and actions than adults.32 8
Many states have laws that expressly ban bullying, including Georgia,
yet Georgia's law did not apply to Jaheem Herrera because it only
applied to students in grades six through twelve, and Herrera was in the
fifth grade.3 29 Perhaps the school officials had a responsibility to
prevent the students from calling him "gay" under the holdings of
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeieraso and Tinker. Yet the Judge

324.

478 U.S. at 686 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
325. J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 08-03824 SVW (CWX), 2010 U.S.

Dist. WL 1914215, at *12 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2010) (recognizing it was foreseeable that a
"video [clip] would make its way to campus").
326. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007).
327. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
328. See, e.g., B.J. Casey et al., Imagine the Developing Brain: What Have We Learned
About Cognitive Development?, 9 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE ScI. 104 (2005); L.P. Spear, The
Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCi. & BIOBEHAV.
REV. 417 (2008).
329. Dionne Walker, Bullying Laws Give Scant Protection,ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept.
14, 2009, http://www.aje.conm/news/nation-world/bullying-laws-give-scant-137805.html.
330. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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who conducted the investigation on behalf of DeKalb County concluded
that Jaheem's suicide was not the result of wrongdoing by the staff at
Dunaire Elementary School, that Jaheem was not bullied, and that "gay"
meant "happy."33 '
In October 2009, another Georgia student allegedly hung himself as
a result of being bullied.3 The student's parents claimed that he was
depressed after years of bullying, which included being called "gay" and
alleged physical abuse. 3 The parents filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against the Murray
County School District, alleging that the student's right to equal
protection was violated, and that the administration indirectly played a
role in the teen's death. 3
Recently, the Georgia House of Representatives passed legislation that
"set[I a January 2011 deadline for the state Department of Education to
develop an anti-bullying policy . .. [which would] include age-appropriate consequences for bullying from kindergarten through [twelfth]
grade."33" The bill was sponsored by Representative Mike Jacobs, who
"said the bill was sparked by the death . .. of Jaheem Herrera."33 1 On
April 29, 2010, in the last hours of the Georgia Legislative Session, the
Georgia Senate voted to approve the amended version of the house
bill.33 1 "While the bill d[id] not specifically address bullying based on
sexual orientation or gender identity, lobbyists believe it will help
[lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, and transgender] students" who are bullied on
those grounds."
Unfortunately, cyberbullying may be a more complex issue. To
address this problem, courts may be forced to retreat from their overly
legalistic approach in applying the First Amendment to school-age
children. Courts should allow for broad discretion, and if appropriate
under one or more of the theories set forth in this Article finding

331. Bagby, supra note 207; Torres, supra note 203.
332. D. Aileen Dodd, ParentsSue District,PrincipalOver Bullied Son'sDeath,ATLANTA
J. CONST., Mar. 19, 2010, http://www.ajc.com/news/parents-sue-district-principal
385837.html.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Nancy Badertscher, Anti-bullying Bill PassesHouse, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 30,
http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/anti-bullying-bill-passes
2010,
420066.html.
336. Id.

337.

Laura Douglas-Brown, Anti-Bullying Bill Passes in FinalHours of Ga. Legislative

Session, GA. VOICE, Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.thegavoice.com/index.phpnews/georgia-news
menu/285-anti-bullying-bill-passes-in-final-hours-of-ga-legislative-session.
338. Id.
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liability, they should require school officials to act to control cyberbullying if it continues in any form or has an intended and foreseeable effect.
In light of the pervasiveness of bullying throughout schools and the
public's ever increasing awareness of bullying, school officials will need
the necessary tools to restrict the free, yet harmful, speech rights of
bullying students. While the theories of public school liability-including
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,"" the doctrine of in loco parentis, and
violations of Title IX 40-may provide possible remedies, school districts
need to consider other methods of protection. Perhaps the time has come
to specifically address bullying based on sexual orientation and gender
identity. Moreover, who is better able to provide that protection to
students, the school officials or the courts? If states and school officials
do not move forward to protect the right to an education, then the
courts, after the expense of litigation, will end up imposing that liability.

339. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
340. 20 U.S.C. H§1681-1688 (2006).

